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IN THE SUPREME COURT.OF 
INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTION, 
INC., a Nevada Corporation, 
and PRITCHETT CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, a Joint Venture, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
_,J: 
STATE OF UTAH, by and . · ·-., < ·,. • thr~ the DEPARTQN1 OE'~,. 
TRANSPORTATION, . "· • .,;», ., __ .· ... 
•< , • ·~{ 't·~·/. 
Defendant an~ \ ..,.; ,, ·. 
Ap~J..!lnt. ·. " 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
----00000----
INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTION, 
INC., a Nevada Corporation, 
and PRITCHETT CONSTRUCTION 
COHPANY, a Joint Venture, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
STATE OF UTAH, by and 
through the DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
----00000----
BRIEF OF APPELJ..ANT 
----00000----
Case No. 15167 
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This case arises out of the alleged breach ofa 
road construction contract by the 7\ppellant with a clai:i 
for dc.mages including anticipc>.ted profit under an antic:-
patory breach of contract theoL·y by Res;::ionde!1t. llppefa 
alleged that F.espondent first breached the contract and. 
liable to Appellant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The ::rial court, the Honorable J. Harlan Burns, 
breached the contract and that said breach was mat~i~q 
anticipatory in nature. 'I'he court deterrnir;ed ·aillilages, i·! 
eluding loss of profit in the total sum of 
and awarded same on the 25th day of March, 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON .l\.PPEAL 
i 
$1, 346, 754.l',I 
1977. 
Appellant seeks the following relief on appeal: 
i 
1. A dctern1ination that Respondent first breache'I 
the contract and judgment for damc:ges resulting thereiro:1· 
· t R d t · th alternative, an order rem:. agains ~span.en or, in 1e 
ing the case to the trial court for a proceeding to dete. 
the d~~ages due by Respondent; or, 
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2. For an order determining that the ~ctions 
of the Joint Venture Respondents subsequent to the al-
leged breach of the contract by Appellant on September 
26, 1975, constituted an election of remedies to proceed 
with performance of the contract and that the subsequent 
refusal of Respondents to perform is a breach of the 
contract by said Respondents; or 
3. For an order determining that the damages 
awarded by the trial court are excessive and should be 
modified by the deletion of all the alleged anticipated 
profit, rental of equipment from and after October 24, 
1975, deletion of general damages, deletion of the cost 
of water, salaries to key personnel, restoration of price 
reduction for paving done after the alleged breach; or 
4. For an order modifying the judgment by the 
allowance of additional offsets for uncompleted contract 
items; or 
5. For an order awarding Appellant a new trial 
for the reason that the trial court committed substantial 
errors which cannot be corrected without a new trial. 
FACTS 
The parties entered into a contract for the con-
struction of a segment of I-15 in H:i.llard County from North 
Holden to Scipic on the ll"'.:h day uf September, 1974. (Exh. 
-2-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
* "'--ll) L In the spring of 19 ·; 5, qu12s Lions urose r.:on-
c:c~·ning aggregate stc:cagc for later use in bituminous 
paving mj.xc3. '";:>pellant' s Project Enc;ineer notified R•· 
spondent by letter on Mav 6, 1975 (Exh D-5) 'L-h•• -h 
" • ·,._l (.. ::. ee:: 
56 and 57 of the special provisions of the contract 
which require separate siz2d aggrc:gate wore controllinq 
spcncent replied on I·la.y 8, 1975 (Exh. D-6) and cited s-.j 
55 of the provisions. The Appellant's reply on May 12, I 
(Exh. D-7) expl2ins that sheets 56 and 57 of the provid 
I 
<:ir2 not influenced by sheet 55 which pertains to dryer-:j 
I 
mixing. This letter concluded by stating: "You are rec.~ 
r:o comply with t:l1e directions covered by these sheets.' I 
5G and 57.) Subsequently, on May 14, 1975, Respondent:.j 
a letter (Exh. D-·8) to Appellant's engineer outlining LI 
contractor's objections to the specified method of aggri· 1 
gate storage and requested the engineer to permit Respor: 
to use an alternate method under the provisions of S~L 
I . I 108.05, Paragraph 7 of the Standard Specifications, ~I 
which allows for changes under certain conditions. ~ 
pellant's engineer responded 11ay 16, 1975 (Exh. D-9) tha: 
he "lacked the 2uthority to change specifications b~' 
forward the requf"s t. " On May 2 8, 19 7 5, each of the parl 
* This cc.se w.?.s ti.!:u:ccated for trial. 'l'h12 record for/: 
part of the tria.l be.gins wit.h Pa9e l. To avoid co\:; 
references to th<:> rcccrd of the first phase of the 
. .. · h age refe:· have the nlL'Tlber 1 immedia t:ely fol lowJ ng t e P i· 
a number 2 irrL'lledi.at.ely followin9 the pnge refer1~~~ · 
co.tes the seco11d phase of the trial in July of · l 
-3--
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originated letters to the other concerning the aggregate han-
dling. Appellant's letter (Exh. D-1) stated that it preferred 
the contractor to follow the specifications and that if they 
were to be relaxed it would require an appropriate price re-
duction. The Respondent's letter (Exh. P-2) stated that the 
Respondent would produce three stockpiles of aggregate of dif-
ferent sizes. Appellant's engineer sent a letter to Respondent 
on June 4, 1975, {Exh. P-3) approving the proposal contained in 
Respondent's letter, (Exh. P-2) and stated that the proposal 
"meets the intent of the specification." * Respondent began 
the production of bituminous paving material on September 18, 
1975. (R. 88) 1 At that time, Respondent had only one aggregate 
pile located at the plant site. (R. 104) 1 Two piles of aggre-
gate containing coarse and fine aggregate respectively, were 
located approximately ten miles away at the other end of the 
project. (R. 105) 1 On September 23, 1975, Appellant's engineer 
notified Respondent by letter (Exh. P-5) that the location of 
the three piles was contrary to the Special Provisions and 
Respondent's proposal. He directed the Respondent to ''sup-
ply two or more stockpiles at the plant site." Respondent 
did not provide the piles as directed, and on September 26, 1975, 
the Respondent was handed a letter dated September 25, 1975, 
(Exh. P-6) which stated in pertinent part "that the Respondent 
would not be paid for noncompliance bituminous surface course," 
* The Special Provision (Exh. D-4, sheet~ 56 and ?7l r7quir~d 
that aggregate be stored in separate piles.of d7ffering.s7ze 
and that this material be fed from these piles in the mixing 
process for better control. 
-4-
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allegedly since it did not 
28, 1975 (Exh. P-2) or the 
; 
I 
comply with ~i~ letter of May I 
special provision. Responden!i 
I 
thereafter terminated operations. Following 
of discussion (R. 122, 129-131) 1 and exchange 
a brief Per;i 
of correspo::i 
ence, (Exh. P-6 and D-3) the Respondent commenced a lawsuil 
on October 1, 19 7 5. Subsequently, the Respondent, on or I 
I 
about October 31, 1975, completed paving the northbound 
lane in the vicinity of the Scipio ·Summit so that traffic 
could be detoured onto said northbound lane. The other 
joint venture partner, Pritchett Construction Company, Ci: 
tinued performance from the 26th day of September 1975 to 
1 January, 1976, without interruption. (R. 135) Respondent 
Industrial Construction, Inc., prior to resuming operatic· 
in October of 1975, notified Appellant in writing (Exh. i 
that it was returning to work "solely in order to protect 
the work performed to date." (Finding of Fact No. 24) App!: 
lant responded by letter, stating that it considered Indu, 
Construction Co. and Pritchett Construction Company b~unal 
contract. (P-10) The Respondent, Pritchett Construction~ 
pany' did not at any time inform Appellant in writing tha!I 
its performance after September 2 6, 19 7 5, was in any way t 
ditional. It allegedly informed Appellant verballyofW 
Subsequent to September 26, 197 5, the Respondent Industri· 
Construction, Inc., kept equipment and some operators ana 
-5-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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supervisors in a standby status pending a resolution of 
the impasse between the parties. At the conclusion of 
the work in October, 1975, Respondent Industrial Con-
struction, Inc. suspended operations. No further work 
was accomplished by Respondent, Industrial Construction 
co. thereafter. Pritchett Construction Company ~orked 
until January, 1976. The issue of liability was tried 
to the Court, Judge J. Harlan Burns, beginning March 25, 
1976. Subsequently, the Court ruled that a breach of 
contract had been committed by Appellant. The issue of 
damages was tried thereafter in July of 1976, and after 
submission of briefs and further argument, judgment wc:s 
entered on the 25th day of March, 1977, for the sum of 
$1,346,754.59. Appellant filed its appeal thereafter. 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF 
WAS EXCUSED FROM HAVING TO COMPLY WITH 
THE SPLIT STOCKPILE PROVISION IS ERRONEOUS 
AND CONTRARY TO LAW AND IGNORES THE FACT 
THAT PLAINTIFF FIRST BREACHED THE CONTRACT. 
The contract between the parties contained a 
special provision (Exh. D-4, Pages 56 and 57) which in 
essence required any prospe~tive bidder to separate the 
gravel aggregate into two-or more piles of differing sized 
cor.iposition. The intention of the specification is to 
guarantee a more positive control of the material going 
-6·· 
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into the bituminous mixer to in turn get u product of 
more consistent grada.tion. 
Th2 contract also cont-c~i· ned an -c t 
.. --' ".cep ·ance pre. 
vis ion regarding gradation and bitumen content at t~ 
point of placerr.ent on the highw2y grade. This provish 
further established a method of accepting material at a 
reduced price when the mix was not fully acceptable but, 
1vi thin certain allowable tolerances. (Exh. D-4, pp. 40-
The evidence shows that between September u, ~ 
I 
and September 25, 1975, the contractor produced 9,865,q 
of "bituminous surface course 3/4" maximtLn. (Exh. D-11) 
this sum, 3,250.75 tons were accepted without a oricenr 
tion and 6,615.20 tons were accepted with a. pricco reduc:f 
The evidence further shows tbat at the time 
paving began, Respondent had constructed one pile of a1cc 
I 
gate at the site of the hot mix plant and had screenedtt 
I 
ditional piles of material which contained material e1f 
I 
larger than that which would pass a No. 1  screen (4 ope:~ 
I 
per square inch) or all of which would pass throu~a~ 
I 
4 screen. These piles were loca'ced at the other end oi· 
job some ten miles away. 
complied with his letter 
asserts that the special 
1 
(R. 6'.i) ·• Respondent asserts' 
1 
of May 2 8 , 19 7 5 ( R. 2 3 5) and L 
1, 
pro·Ji::>lon (Exh. D-4, pp. 56,571"· 
· t oft! specify that the piles must be located at: the s1 e 
mix plant. 
·- 'i --
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The evidence at trial essentially was to the 
effect thut with continuous mix asphalt plants the only 
method of controlling aggregate gradation was in the feed-
ing process. The splitting of the aggregate enables this 
to be accomplished by adjusting the feeding of aggregate 
from separate piles. (R. 230) 1 
The Respondent contended among other things that 
it: (1) had a different type of plant and thus should be ex-
cused from the aggregate specification; or (2) that it had 
received verbal assurance from State representatives that 
it would not have to comply with that provision. 
As to the first point, the evidence shows that the 
plant is a continuous mix plant with some modifications. (R. 
29-30) 1 There did appear to be a capability of removing some 
of the finest sized material. (R. 29) 1 Notwithstanding this 
evidence, Appellant submits that a careful reading of the ag-
gregate storage provision (Exh. D-4, pp. 56, 57) 1 and a com-
parison of the evidence (R. 29-31) 1 shows that the plant in 
question was not unique enough to be excluded from the type 
of plant which the specification was written to cover. 
As to the second point, the trial Court has ruled 
that the Respondent "was reasonably led to believe that an ad-
justment would be made in the provisions of said construction 
contract so as to eliminate the use of the split stockpile 
method in Respondent's production of bituminous surface course 
material." (Conclusion of Law No. 2) 
-8-
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While ordinarily an nppellant cannot properly I 
rais2 a factual issue on app2ul, it is submitted thati:.: 
this instance the facts should bE~ reviewed carefull ,.· y, •!1 
' they demonstrate th2 fallacy of the Court's conclusion,,! 
factually and legally. 
The alleged "adjustment" in the; split stockp;, 
method results from a conveL·sation bc;l:'.;een Lalif£ \'/ood,:( 
tiff's owner and C. V. Anderson, Appellant's assist~t~ 
tor. Wood's version of the conversation (R. 39-4l)lis•l 
the conversation occurred prier to the submission of aJ 
on the day of the bid opening. (June 20, 1974) Anderson' 
version is that it occurred at a later date. (R. 421) 1c 
struction commencer] in July of 1974, and ::10t until Marc:1 
19 7 5 did the dispute concerning aggregate storage surfac' 
(R. 41, 
1
42) 1 
The facts show that in July of 1974 at the ti.r:! 
the preconstruction conference, the "split stockpi~~~ 
was d:i:scussed. During trial, a transcription of the discu!' 
dm ' t"l was placed in evidence. (Exh. D-19) Laliff Wood a ,1 ,e:, 
th t · t (R. 219) 1 '1'l1e significant po::[ e ranscript was correc_. 
is that at no time during this conversation dealing with' 
provision in issue was anything said about Respond~t~ 
exempt from that provision and/or ind12ed asserting that 
had l• n fo.ct occ11rred, which if conversation with Anderson . -
is to be believed, was only a few days previous to the prec· 
struction conference. 
-9-
I 
I 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Not only is there a dispute concerning the date 
of the conversation, but the substance of the alleged con-
versation is disputed. (Compare R. 39-41 with R. 416-421). 1 
It is, however, Appellant's contention that the 
Court's conclusion regarding the non-application of the split 
stockpile provision because of the alleged assurance apparently 
arising from a conversation prior to bidding is erroneous and 
contrary to contract law in any event. If the conversation 
did in fact take place on the day of the bid, then it should 
be considered as merged in the contract. In the case of Na-
tional Surety Corp. v. Christiansen Brothers, Inc., 29 Ut.2d 
460, 511 P.2d 731, it is stated: 
Where par~1es engage in negotiations 
concerning a transaction pursuant to which they 
enter into a written contract, it is presumed 
that all matters relating to subject are merged 
in and constitute a complete integration of their 
agreement. 
The contract does not in fact recite that Respondent could 
ignore the provisions of sheet 56 (Exh. D-4) or that they 
did not apply to him as Respondent alleged and the trial 
Court erroneously found. 
The real question, it is asserted, is rather what 
did Respondent's proposal as contained in the letter of May 
28, 1975 (Exh. P-2) obligate Respondent to do and has Re-
spondent breached that obligation? 
Appellant submits that everything which occurred 
prior to May 28, 1975, is moot, including alleged assurances 
-10-
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regarding the nonapplication of sheets 56 dnct 57 
to Re- ! 
spondent, if that letter in fact constitutes a nPw 
- Pro-
posal. Appellant submits that the letter has to b 
e re,:a 
in the context of correspondence and contractual ' provisi,:: 
as well as discussions which either existed or occurred 
prior thereto to ascertain the intent of the proposal, 
I 
is therefore clear that Respondent, having been informE,ij 
the requirement to split the aggregate and knowing thi;,j 
i 
Appellant's inherpretation of the contract provision, 'i:o:I 
I 
making a proposal to compJ_y by constructing "three pile!, 
' 
one plus 4, one minus 4, and one of "natural material.' 1 
I 
Read in the context of sheets 56 and 57 of the contract j 
specL:il provie:ions (Exh. D-4), this clearly meets the ii:! 
of that provision. I 
The Respondent asserted and the trial ~ourt er:l 
ously accepted the point that "neither the original spec. 
ti on nor the mod if ica ti on contained any requirement as ti 
where the three stockpiles were to he located." 
Pact No. 4) 
Appellant concedes that the language 
provision (Exh. D-4, Sheets No. 56 and 57) ~oes 
cally require that the separate sized agsregate 
the plant site, nor does Respondent's letter of 
(F indin~ j 
I 
i 
of the wt 
not 3pecr 
be stor:'I 
May 28, ! 
(Exh. P-2) While it is true that the exact langua~~ 
exist in either Exhibit, Appellant asserts that 
-11-
anyone o: 
I 
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mon intelligence would obviously assume that 11 competent 
contractor would locate the sepa.rate sized piles at the plant 
site. The intent of the specification is obvious from the 
language. In sheet number 56 (Exh. D-4) it states, "The minus 
4 aggregate shall be fed to the drier at a uniform rate. 11 
Since the mix cannot consist of only minus 4 aggregate, it fol-
lows that a pile of plus 4 aggregate is required and it is be-
yond belief that a contractor will locate that at another lo-
cation and haul it in for every mix. This language certainly 
implies that the stockpiles will be located at the plant site. 
If in writing the letter of May 28, 1975, (Exh. P-2) 
Respondent knew or intended that Appellant would be misled 
into believing that it intended compliance with the split stock-
pile method while intending all along not to comply, then Re-
spondent is guilty of fraud. Appellant's letter of acceptance, 
dated June 4, 1975, (Exh. P-3) shows that Appellant understood 
Respondent's letter to mean compliance "with the contract speci-
fications as bid." Respondent's silence thereafter is further 
evidence of its apparent intent to mislead Appellant into be-
lieving rtespondent intended compliance. 
Certainly, Appellant understood the letter to mean 
compliance witl1 the specifications of the contract. The Court 
rejec~ed this in its finding. That is patent error. This 
Court has recently spoken concerning ambiguous documents in 
the case of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Midwest Realty & Finance 
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~~~.' SH P.2r:1 fl82 (1975), when~in it is stated: 
. In dealin~ with a document whi~ 
'?1'1ll1.r1uous or uncertain.. l:!1e <Jeneral rule is:·; 
:tt should be construed strictly against t' ;l 
l t . I" d he, "':o wru e.it .r'.l we~t)an~ fa:-•orablytothe~· 
pc.rty ag <LLn st •:,·horn J. t is invoKed (Wells p ; 
., . th h d . argc. 
1< L~1: .. e~, w er. a acumen t is of f_hat character,j 
tnc Lcial co .. irt can take extraneous eviden ··' 
l 1 L t"- 1 . Cti 
- OQ,-C c_O • i,C tota circumstances to determine, 
the parties should reasonably be deemed tor.of 
'..lndccstood thioreby. Th~:se principles are to! 
co~.siden:d together_ w~ ~l:. this ~ur~her propos:I 
that: where c:bcre 1va:o a:ts(:itJte, it is the pren 
of ti.'e trial court to determine whose evidenc 
will believe. · 
How can the correspondence be looked at objectively anii 
language be ;i,,; sco:-istrued? It is obvious from Appellan:I 
letter of June 4, 1975, (Exh. P-3) that it believed Re: 
in t'2nded to comply with the intent of the specificatiQ[ 
lippellant sub:ni ts the trial Court has interpr 
the specifications and the correspondence related ili~ 
properly. Appellant request~ that this Court~~~wL 
documents o.nd c:orrect the error of the trial Court. 
This Court has recently stated that this pro; 
action is appropriate in the case of Lake v. Hemes~ 
552 P.2d 126 (1976) wherein it is stated: 
• The defendant places reliance on· 
standard presumptions o~ credibility and v;::: 
to be accorded the find7ngs and JUdgme~t oat; 
trj al court. However, in a case of this n 
· - . ~ dep · 
where the resolution o..: the controversy the, 
upon the medning to be given documents, , ; 
;::curt is in no more f,'lvored position and is: 
. · g of sucn better able to deterrrune the meanin 5• documents than is ti1 is court. Therefore, a. 
• . • clo not app. 
such an issue, tnose pres•Jr.iptions 2 ~~: [Citing Burns v. s:<ogstad, 69 Idaho 227, 
765 (194-9) J 
-13--
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Operations com~enced on September 18, 1975, and 
continued on September 19 and September 22. On September 
23, 1975, Appellant informed Respondent by letter of its non-
compliance with its proposal of May 28, 1975. (Exh. P-2) 
This letter also points out the failure to comply with special 
provisions covering sections 403 and 407. (Exh. D-4) This 
letter further directs Respondent to supply "two or more stock-
piles at the plant site." 
Appellant submits that the foregoing facts and evi-
dence show a clear breach of the contract by Respondent, either 
of the special provision contained in sheet 56, (Exh. D-4) or 
as.,uming that provision of the contract did not apply due to 
verbaj_ assurances, then of the su.bseql.lent proposal of M=.y 28, 
1975, (Exh. P-2) submitted by Respondent. In either event, 
Respondent was clearly in breach of the contract or his own 
proposal prior to any breach by Appellant arising out of the 
letter of September 25, 1975. (Exh. P-6) 
The case of Lowe ~-Rosenloff, 12 Ut.2d 190, 364 P.2d 
418, is a case involving suit by an administrator of a deceased 
subcontractor to recover money allegedly due on a subcontract 
and damages. The Court states the following rule: 
. • • It is an elementary priciple of the 
law of contracts that in order to recover upon 
a contract, the contractor must first establish 
his own nerformance or a valid excuse for his 
failure ~o perform. (Citing authorities including 
A.~.Jur.) Since plaintiff failed under the uncontra-
dicted proof to complete the work he.;ontra;:ted to 
do, without valid excuse for such fai~ure, ne was 
entitled to no judgment against defendant. 
-14-
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The same reasoning should ,1rply in this 
that the Respondent contractor in ~ o1_- ~Pr to c;," 
a brc;:ich of contract must first dcmonC'trate th~t he :
1
.j 
·1 
self he.s not, in fact, breached the contract. 
c 3. ted above th ::t t be tween Sept;:: 
18, 1975 ancl September 26, l975, the r_·ontractor prccr_,: 
The facts as 
9,865095 tons of bit-uminous surface course, and of 
6, 615. 20 tons were subject to a price reduction since:! 
did not co:nplet~ly meet the specifications i_ndicate a 
1 lem. While it is true the contract allows ror accepk, 
of rnilterial at a reduced price which is close to beir.oj 
specification, the intent was not to pee-mi t a contrac:: 
continually ~roc~uce ma.terial r.ot in full compliance. 1: 
l 
D-11 and R. 323)- It is designed to assist with payner.: 
a contractor at a lesser price on those few o:::casions·: 
the full specifications are ~ot met. 1 (R. 323) Here,: 
thirds of tho product in the first seven days' operati:· 
to meet full compliance. It was thus apparent that a -
p.coC!uct could not be con sj s ten tly produced a~ early asll 
fourth production day. ':'he contractor 1-1as dnected oi 
tember 23, 1975, to comply ·;1ith the specification aS!' 
' ' 1 t 1 of May 28, r\ written or with his own a ter.na e proposa 
' J 1\ppellant further submit:s th~ following sta•, 
froi•\ 17 .'un.J•.ir.2d 989, Section ~41 on contracts as beir.:t 
(Exh. P-5) 
point: 
-15·-
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• • • It is held that a party who seeks to 
recover damages from the other party to a con-
tract for a breach must show that he himself is 
free from fault in respect to performance of a 
d~p~ndent promise or counter promise, or a con-
dition precedent. 
1\.s a matter of fact, what we have here is a c:lassic 
case of "first breach." 'I'he general law in this area is well 
stated in 17 A.~.Jur.2d 807, Section 366 under contracts, as 
follows: 
..• As a rule, a party first guilty of a 
substantial or material breach of contract cannot 
complain if the other party thereafter refuses 
to perform. He can neither insists on performance 
by the other party nor maintain an action by the 
otheY party for a subsequ.eP-t failure to perform. 
At least the party first committing a substantial 
breach of the contract cannot maintain an action 
against the other contracting party for a subse-
quent f<dlure to p8rform when the promises are de-
pendent. It has also been said that where a con-
tract has not performed, the party who is guilty 
of the first breach is generally the one upon whom 
rests all the liability of the nonperformance. 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
Under the rationale of the authorities cited, and 
in view of the facts which exist in this case, it seems clear 
that the first breach was the failure of Respondent to comply 
with the specification or his alternate proposal. Appellant's 
letter of September 23, 1975, (Exh. P-5) and Respondent's con-
tinued refusal to comply with the engineer's direction to pro-
1 
vide at least two stockpiles at the hot plant site, (R. 673) 
constituted a breach of contract. Under the doctrine of first 
breach, this would make the alleged breach on the part of Ap-
-16-
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i 
I 
sincrc> Respondent is legally prevewl 
··1 
from enforcing the contract under the authorities 
his own "first breach." 
Conceivably, there could be a que3tion 
the engineer's authority to so order the location~~; 
stockpiles as sci: forth in his letter of September 2J, ,; 
(Exh. P-5) 'lnd prior verbal dirGctions. (R. 673) 1 On''i 
''I 
point the Court's attention is invited to Section iosi 
the Standard Specifications (Exh. D-2), which states 
tinent part as follows: 
. The Engineer will decide all quesL 
which may arise as to the quality and accepta:. 
of matericcls :EurnishGd anJ work performed ana 
the rate or progress of the work; all questic" 
\·!hich 'noy ,,,,; se as to the acceptable fulfillE 
of the contract on the part of the contractor. 
Qui i:e i::learly Appellant's engineer considerea· 
absolute failure 0£ Respondent to follow the provisions 
sh.:eets 56 and 57 (Exh. D-4) or his own letter of May 11,f 
as the cause of the problem which results in a failure'~ 
the quality standards of the c.ontract. . . ,.1 
Appellant submits that an objective review d 
contract documents, the correspondence in eviden~whl~ 
cited herein, and r~he testimony in evidence as well as!-
tinent legal authorities, derr,onstrates that the Court's. 
cannot be legally sustained and, that in fact the ~ijr 
was legally in breach of either the contractorhisoiiTI' 
nate proposal prior to September 26, 1975. 
-17--
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II 
THE JUDGMENT IS INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY 
TO LAW SINCE RESPONDENT WAS GUILTY OF THE 
FIRST BREACH, OR UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF 
ELECTION OF REMEDIES THE ACTIONS OF THE 
JOINT VENTURE PARTNERS AF'TER 'l'HE ALLEGED 
BRF.ACH CONSTITUTED AN ELECTION TO CONTINUE 
PERFORMANCE AND RESPONDENT HAS BREACHED 
THE REVIVED CONTRACT. 
OVERVIEW 
Appellant submits that a careful review of the 
documents in evidence make it abundantly clear that the Re-
spondent Industrial Construction, Inc. first breached the 
contract and that the subsequent breach o~ the contract by 
Appellant, if in fact there was a breach, is the ultimate 
responsibility of said Respondent. 
It is further submitted that the actions of both 
of the Respondent joint venture partners subsequent to the 
breach determined by the trial Court constitute an election 
to proceed with performance of the contract and that Respon-
dent's subsequent refusal to perform after it had returned 
to work is a breach of the revived contract. 
Appellant further submits that the Court's award 
of amounts over contract prices for work done by Respondent 
Industrial Construction, Inc. after the date of the Court 
determined breach is inconsistent and reflects gross error. 
The trial Court has used a contract formula to calculate dam-
<iges after ruling that no contract existed. The proper measure 
-18-
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of damages wo~lrt be the reasonable value of the 
'l'V'Otk, it 
damages were due. 
These three Points will be treated in t' 
.1e fot 
sections: 
A. FIRST BREACH 
This Point is covered in Section I of this brk 
and Appellant incorporates that arg1~ent here. 
B. ELECTION OF REMEDIES 
Appellant asserts that Respondent's act~m~ 
sequent to the alleged breach on September 26, 1975 under 
th0 r1oct-.ri.nP this Court annotinced i.n thp case of Hurwitz 
David K. Richards Company, 20 Ut. 2d 232, 436 P.2d 794 ii 
which outlines three alternatives to one not in breach,·· 
to an election to continue performance. The Court in fa: 
said, one who suffers a breach can (1) rescind the contu 
pursue available remedies; (2) treat the contract as bin' 
and wil.it until the time for performance and bring action' 
breach; 
general 
Section 
or (3) sue for damages. This case is in line wit·! 
rule of law as set out in 17 A C.J.S. 657 [Contrcl 
472(1)] 11herein it is stated: 
. The party not in default has alter· 
native remedies open to him, and he may not pul' 
sue all of them; specifically, he may n~tl-, 
· · b h and at '· damages as for an c.nticipatory reac ·~
sume time treat the contract us i.n force. ( 
phasis supplied.) 
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This is consistent with equitable principles enunciated 
in the case of Jameson v. Wirtz, 396 P.2d 68 (Arizona), 
wherein the Court stated: 
II 
•• Equity abhors forfeiture and 
will seize upon slight circumstances to 
relieve a party therefrom." 
This Court has also spoken in this context in the 
case of Green v. Palfreyman, 109 U. 291, 166 P.2d 215, where-
in the Court states the following: 
11 
• Forfeitures are not favored • . • 
every reasonable presumption should be indulged 
against intention to allow a forfeiture. 11 
Applying the foregoing principles to the facts of 
this case it is obvious that Respondent's ~ctions subsequent 
• 
to the alleged breach raise a "presumption" against a forfeiture 
and constitute an election to continue to perform. This is all 
the more evident in face of the letter from Appellant, dated 
October 24, 1975, (Exh. P-10) which states in effect that the 
contract still exists. If Respondent was correct in relying 
on the letter of September 25, 1975, (Exh. P-6) as constituting 
a breach, then it had the three potential remedies under the 
Hurwit~ doctrine, supra. Under the Palfreyman rule, supra, 
every reasonable presumption goen against forfeiture which 
was one of the remedies. It is thus apparent that any act 
contrary to forfeiture for whatever alleged spurious reason 
should constitute an irr~vocable election. Respondent's sub-
sequent refusal to perform thus becomes a breach of the "re-
vived contract." 
-20-
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The Court has erred in refusing to all 
ow Appe[., 
i 
lant to submit evi' dc•nce rPgar·' ;ng · \1~ f I ~ -· u.c ·c " per. ormanc'" of bo: .. 
Hesponc1enc :Cndustrie<l Construction, Inc. and Pritchetti 
struction Company subsequent to the breach. The Coott I 
listened to _l'(espondent' s evidence al.lout the nat11re of l 
1·10rk and its nece,-;si ty according to said Respondent's t'. 
(cl.. 171-177) 1 The Appellant, however, was prevcntedbyi 
Court from showing that it had in fact made plans to h;: 
traffic in an alternate manner and that the work was no: 
er i tic al as the Respondent asserted. (See Proffer on tL! 
point.) (R. 699--702) 1 This evidence would have rebutt'. 
evidence of Respondent that the only reason it performci 
subsequent to the alleged breach was to avoid "potential 
bi1ity." The fact is, Respondent did nothing concernin~ 
h::i.ndling of traffic until he was informed that Appellant 
planning to use the ex is ting roadway for traffic. This' 
Motivated Respondent to perform the paving ostensibly ta 
i:ect itself but as Appellant's evidence would show, this 
not in fact true. 
INCONSISTENT JUDGMEN'l' 
Notwithstanding the fact the Court has detemi: 
that Appellant anticipatorily breached the contract, it. 
awarded dc:mages inconsisb;nt with that legal position. 
. · , · · d addition~ I Respondent submitted eviuence that it incurre 
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costs of $49,554.18 over the amount payable pursuant to 
the contract. Appellant submitted no evidence on this point 
since it considered that performance after an alleged breach 
is an election of one of the remedies open to a party, and 
by electing this approach compensation should be governed by 
the contract. (R. 48-49) 2 In addition, the Court prevented 
Appellant from submitting evidence. (R. 698-701) 1 
Appellant cites the following cases which sustain 
its position that work done after a breach is to be paid for 
at contract prices and binds hi~ to perform. The case of 
Newark Slip Contracting Co., Inc. v. N.Y. Credit Men's Adjust-
ment Bureau, Inc., 186 F.2d 152 is one such case. This case 
involved work done by the plaintiff after a failure of defen-
dant to pay which the Court construed as a breach. The plain-
tiff wanted to recover additional sums. The Court said the 
following: 
. . • If one party to the contract continues 
performance after a breach by the other he must 
continue on the contract terms. [Citing A. 605 
(Schlegel v. Bott); 3 Williston on Contracts, Rev. 
Ed. § 688, 143 A.L.R. 484, 496-503). The breach 
does not permit him to make a new contract without 
the others consent .. 
In the case of Schepf v. McNamara, 354 Mich. 393, 
93 N.W.2d 230, a case involving breach of contract for hauling 
sand after the haul distance was increased, the Court said: 
• • . By continuing thus to perform and to 
accept payments under it, as above noted, he lost 
his right, if any, to terminate the contract and 
declare it forfeited. (Citing ~obinson v. Lak~ Shore 
& U.S. Railway Co., 103 Mich. 607, 61 N.W. 1041) 
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Lt was appellant's dulv when it d' 
h . ' " . l scov . t e ~ppa1cnt breach of the contract- i'f · ~ 
t . ' ., ' lt )• o insist upon a forf0i t.__ire, to do ~o ·1 
. . . ~ at one. permi L:tin<; apucdlees to proceecJ 1,,i· t-!1 L' •·. 
< . - ·-lle P·'r' 
of thE~ con1:r2.ci: it waivc,d d hrecich. Grano;:·:] 
~ll_m_ber Co. ·1. SJ i.;ck-l{ress Tie & Stove;~. 
7 9 ' l 43 s . \•I • 5 8 J • . ' ~I i·: I 
Where thece h2.s been il material breach 
do~s not ~n.Jicate an intention to rr::-;:iudiate, 
mainJ.er OJ. th~ ,~ontract, the injured party 'I 
genu.i.ne e L~ection either of continuing perforc 
or ~f ceasing to r:r:~cforrr.. 1'\ny act indicatinc. 
i1.n intent to continue will operat0 as a cone: 
election, not indeed of depriving hi.m of a .;:I 
of action for the breach which has alre~yG 
pl~ce, bu: depri'.•ir.g him o~ any excuse for °'·I 
pe .. formance on his own pare •..• 
Obviously, the Appellant did not consent toc.:! 
contract or increase in cost over contract prices" as ;;j 
from 5.ts le>tter fJf Octoh'?.".' 2.<!, 1975. (E:~h. 0.-:1.0) 
l'.ppella.nt sub1ni ts that Rcsi:;onderit' s election :1 
the wo:ck after .rece:>iving Appellan+_' s letter of October i 
1975 (Exh. P-10) is an implied acceptance of the:> contra:i 
that recovery cannot exceed the amount the contract wou::) 
If the trial Court is correct that the contract was bre:' 
then recovery should be based on a quantum merui t_ theory, I 
on a force account basis whj_ch is the way Respondent's ·j 
mony was submitted. (R. 48-·50) 2 "Fo:::-ce a.mount" is a cd 
tual remedy for items not otherwise covered by the cont: 
the Court found the contract to be breached. 
The Court hRs al so co;,urri tted errol'.' in refusin)j 
hold that the perforr.iance by the other P-espondent and jo:· 
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venture partner Pritchett Construction Co. (see Proffer of 
Proof, R. 134-136) 1 constitutes an election of remedies to 
continue performance. The same arguments which apply to the 
performance by Respondent Industrial Construction co. apply 
equally to Respondent Pritchett Construction Co. in this 
context. The proffer by Pritchett was challenged and dis-
puted by the witness Jerry Sherman who explained that plans 
had been made which obviated the need for the work to be 
done as alleged by Pritchett. (R. 679-685 and Exh. P-27) 1 
Appellant submits that performance by either or both of the 
joint venture partners following the alleged breach on Sep-
tember 26, 1975, should constitute an election to waive the 
breach and proceed to perform the contract, Hurwitz, supra, 
and consistent with that election to continue, recovery is 
allowed only as the contract provides. 
The trial Court has ignored this election, and in 
fact has "increased the damages" contrary to the rule set out 
in the case of Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co., 35 F.2d 
301 (1929) where the Court said the following: 
While a contract is executory, a 
party has the power to stop performance on 
the other side by an explicit direction to 
that effect, subjecting himself to such 
damages as will compensate the other part~ 
for being stopped in the performance on his 
part at that stage in the execution of the 
contract. The party thus forbidden cannot 
afterwards goon,aTid-thereby increase the 
damages, and then recover s~ages ~ 
the other party. (Emphasis supplied.) 
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rl'ho c>ffect o[ the Co•1c t; .s .culina in t)1 1· s 
-' Ccti• 
in compensC>ting Hespondc1t for work done after the bre: 
in excess of contr~ct prices is directly opposed~~ 
ruling of the Court in ~~~\_ingha~. It rcsul t;:; in a~": 
crease in ti1e damages," which is inconsistent. The 
lant was dnd is willing to compensate r<espondent at co:.· 
tract prices and so advised Respondent prier tot~~ 
being accomplished. 
III 
'l'HE AWARD OF ANTICIPATED PROFIT IS EX-
CESSIVE AND CANNOT BE SUPPORTED IN T~ 
RECORD AND REFLECTS PREJUDICE BY THE 
COURT. 
'l'he trial Court awarded judgment i-n the CJ11oun:! 
of $340,025.18 for anticipated profit on the port~n~ 
work rem<"ining to be completed at i:he time of the Cour'\ 
determined breach of contract.in September o~ 1975. , 
were several memorandums submitted to the trial Court 1.. 
connection with this issue and it apparently represente.:, 
a troublesome issue to decide. Appellant's positiondu:j 
trial, in its memorandums and presently was and is, tha' 1 
there was no substantial amount of anticipated profit 
remaining in the contract ~t the t:il'1e of the Court's 
determined breach in September al 1975. It is respect· 
-·25-
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fully submitted that a review of the record supports 
this contention and quite clearly demonstrates that 
the Court's figure is erroneous and cannot be supported 
by Respondent's own evidence. 
The Court in Finding of Fact No. 33 has found 
that there is remaining work to be performed totaling 
$1,700,125.93 and has arbitrarily found that twenty percent 
of this amount represents anticipated profit. It is sub-
mitted that this cannot be supported legally or factually 
in the record but is simply an arbitrary, capricious deter-
mination by the trial Court and ignores evidence before the 
Court. 
Appellant respectfully urges that this Court ex-
amine carefully the pertinent parts of the record which will 
be referred to hereafter, and which demonstrate the error 
committed by the trial Court. 
Before proceeding to examine the record, this Court 
should understand that the total dollar sum remaining unpaid 
is subject to adjustment based on actual measured quantities. 
'I'he original contract amount is a composite figure based on 
estimated quantities. 
At the time of the alleged breach by Appellant in 
Septemb2r 1975, the original contract amount of $6,680,000.00 
had been increased by the addition of supplemental agreements 
totaling $103,603.56 (Exh. D-77) for a beginning b~lance of 
-26·· 
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• 
;;6,183,603.56. " . 0 '/ r <C ) 7 r o"- L~ .o, .,,., L.;,324.oo: .. 
been earned and naid, cxceot for ~pn1' t 
,. _ - · ' " ·"l.l.CJ.a C' ret·cnt;c 
clnlOUnts il.'3 £F:ovidec1 by the cont.cuct. (E:·:h. D-·67, pg.· 
An additi.onal sum of $27..J,000.00 (Exh. D-67, e>g. 
• l) ,,, 
rresenting unpaid mobilization wos also earned but~:: 
since the contr2ct Frovic1cJ for rc~le0.sc of this a.m,iun: 
the percenl:age of completion incr12ased. The Court ac:i 
Respondent's evidence concerning its unurmortized co3:
1 
pr:oviclin'] water in the cimount of $19,.513.00. (Exh.P·: 
Deducting tllP- a.."llounts referred to leave:; a ba:1.ance o: 
$2,774,766.56. This figure includes w0rk to be acco:.,~ 
b·; the Rec·pc:indent Inc1.ustrial Construction, Inc., by P::\ 
ConstructioJc Co., d!lci by various subcc:intractors. The::! 
en subcon trc::ctors to Respond2nt is the mathcnatical ::1 
between the subcontract price to Industrial and Indus::! 
bid price to Appellant. The Pritchett work has profiti 
which goec; to Pri.tchett:, not Respond2nt. 
i 
!'.ppellant ::;ubmi ts tr.at t~e evidence shows t'·I 
binecl to<:al of subccn tract items and work t:o be done:. 
Pritchett totals 
of $G8,000.00 to 
of $493,120.00. 
$561.120.00 (Exh. P-41) less an overd 
Pritchett o:i. estimate No. 16, or a ne:I 
'l :)'.)Ve includes :I This figure as staced . 
due Respondent on subcontractor it2'1ls and that figure::i 
'"27 -·33 31 (E' h P '1) Jn .:,0.y ,~ .. '.rent, the> remaining:.J 
,,, '"' •• x._ -~ .. -- . 
't ;, 
clue for compl,~tion of the work .:ir.d contractor prof! ·· 
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$2,281,646.56. This remaining figure includes the sum of 
$1,073,708.32 for the contract item of asphalt. Pursuant 
to the contract, the contractor was instructed not to in-
elude profit in this item but was instructed to include 
his profit in other items. (Exh. D-4, Sheet 52) Deducting 
this amount leaves a net figure of $1,277,938.24. Since 
this figure is based on estimated quantities it would be 
expected to change based on actual measured quantities but 
can be assumed to be fairly accurate except where measure-
rnents may reveal a figure at variance from the above. 
In preparation for trial Appellant surveyed the 
remaining roadway excavation work and has determined an ap-
parent underrun in excess of 100,000 yards. (Compare cumu-
lative quantity on Exh. D-69, pg. 2 with estimated quantity 
and testimony of James Cox on pg. 247.) 2 The remaining dif-
ference between the original estimate of this item and the 
actual paid quantity adjusted by the survey is 432,967 cubic 
yards which at $0.92 is $398,329.64. (See difference be-
tween column one and three and five combined on Exh. D-67, 
2 
line A 0060). The witness Hitchcock (R. 109) stated that 
they claim no profit exists in this item, but that it can be 
completed for the contract price. Thus, whether it under-
runs or not becomes moot, except that the remaining amount 
set out must be removed from the remaining money in the con-
tract_. In other words, if it fails to underrun and the con-
-28-
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tractor co1~pictc'3 th,c 1,orl< he T~t.:; t·hc 1ud 
amount, 
by his own cvidc'ncc il: wi 1 l co:;t l:irr, that much to 
'1 
l~hc work. It it docs underrun, :1~ '.vo•1 1 t ~ett~e 
~·. I 
won't incur the cost either. Therefore, dc;cluctir,, 
12aves a net figure of $379,603.60. 
The~ evidenc~~ further show~:i :-_h·cee items,. 
·1 
the original propos,·d totJl 1-1hich l',es,)(lr>clent does :I 
have any profit in lhom. 
Item # 2 £'lagging .. I 
Item # 3 Pilot car 1,:1 
Item 
" 
4 Obliteration of old road 
-l4 r.· 
TOTZ\L ·1~ 
lEXh. D-67, pg. l and pg. 41) 'rti.e evidence also sq 
item of granular borLow was replaced with road•:1ay:J 
(R. 407-417) 2 This item, althoi.;gh a part of the or:J 
posal, has been effectively eliminated and thus lt.oi 
for this item should also be c1l'duct:ed since it isd 
able to assu:rr,2 th?.t it will be utilized when the d 
it was designated to be userl has been completed~J 
way excava i::i on. '~he en9ineer has authority to r:iaH 
changes without approval of the contractor under d 
104.02 of the Standard Specific<ltions, (Exh. D-2) j 
the i l:eIT. is a c, of J "rni!lo.-r i tcr.i 11 u:s C.c _.: inc?d on page J 
D-2. 
d ))eduction at thes2 [igc1res c-;h5.cl1 total ,o. 
leave a nGt figure of $817,949.85. 
--2 9-· 
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In the judgment the Court has awarded certain 
sums which were in dispute or which were measured and de-
termined since the lawsuit was fi'led. h T ese sums may con-
tain profit in them but should not be paid for twice, and 
therefore should be deducted. They are as follows: 
Price reduction for non-specification 
bituminous paving restored by Court $ 1,822.37 
Clearing and grubbing 2,000.00 
Cost of drilling and shooting 28,427.45 
Pipe, rip-rap, top soil, etc. enumer-
ated in paragraph 26(d) of Findings 
of Fact 124,350.94 
Stockpile gravel 10,734.00 
TOTl\L • • $167, 344. 76 
Deduction of this sum leaves a net figure of 
$650,615.09. 
Finally, the Court in Paragraph 28 of the Findings 
of Fact has determined that the Respondent was overpaid for 
certain items by reason of measurements which adjust esti-
mated quantities or the cost of finishing items which Respon-
dent has been paid for but which are not fully completed. 
These items are as follows: 
Adjustment to Roadway Excavation 
Adjustment to Roadway Excavation 
for amount paid for as top soil 
Stipulated off set for finishing 
top soil, clean up, etc. 
Offset for embankment finishing 
TOTAL •.•• 
-30-
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26,301.48 
11,055.00 
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-$4il3,7:18,71 to co''''' the c.:x;t o;' com[Jlotinr; thn .. 
- '·1 
and the profit, i( any, c.h 1.c t~o t~c~;po:1c1c:nt. 
If the Court could arrive 
which App2llant docs not b~!ieve is ~-'Os s ible, the. 
figure, not the flgur2 selected by the Court ~u~ 1 
one to use cts a Io.ctor since it would have items •. 
1 
might contain profit. 
1l1he witnc~ss Erma Hitchcock testified cc.:.t 
Respondent's profit in completing v01ious contract 1 
cording to their figures. ( Exh. P·· ·l l) By ;-nathe.:a:. 
trapolati.on betwec~n the claimed profit- and the bid·! 
Item 
No. Item l>.lllount Bid Cost ProLJ 
------
45 Untreated base 140,960.7 $ l. 60 $ .65 $ .fr 
course tons 
46 Bit. surf ace 167,7Gl.05 3.00 1. 59 L::c 
course tons 
47 Plant mix seal 16, 000 tons 5.00 1. 96 J.::f 
48 Bit. additive 1280 gal. 5.80 4.05 !Ji 
19 Bit. material 120 tons :;5. 00 5 .13 29.J 
(sr:cead) 
50 Bit. material 546.89 tons 10.00 .5 .13 4J1' 
MC 70 
51 De2p pen. 17.G tons 25.00 13.00 12,G: I 
asphalt 
JJ' 52 Blotter 50.0 tons 12.00 9.00 
mah:,:cj<•l 
.il 
. ]') o·· 53 Surfac0 di tchc~> 32, 5CO ft. • J 
'i'O'I'i\L COS'}' !'.>ER RESI'O~;OENT "j 
-·31-
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If this figure is deducted from the net figure 
above of $483,738.71, the anticipated profit would appear 
to be $62,963.04, together with the profit in the subcon-
tracted items of $27,338.31 for a total indicated antici-
pated profit of $90,301.35. 
Since Respondent's cost projections would natural-
ly be expected to reflect the most optimistic projections in 
favor of Respondent, the reality of a profit to Respondent 
by completing the work becomes even more speculative. 
In any event, the Court's use of an arbitrary multi-
plier of twenty percent profit is absolutely unconscionable. 
It appears that the Court refused to examine and consider Ap-
pellant's evidence, including the exhibit derived by cross-
examination of Respondent's witnesses Hitchcock and Wood (Exh. 
D-77) in sufficient detail. Even a cursory review of this 
evidence reveals that there simply is not enough money left 
in the remaining contract to allow recovery of the anticipated 
profit which Respondent claimed and which the Court allowed. 
As to where the Court got its arbitrary multiplier 
of twenty percent and how it determined the sum to which it 
applied, Appellant has no idea. During the examination of 
Mrs. Hitchcock it appeared that the profit margin they were 
claiming was roughly thirty percent. In cross-examniation, 
(R. 149} 2 she was questioned on this point since that type of 
margin is so excessive it obviously had to be.challenged. 
On force accoPnt items an add-on factor is added to allow 
-32-
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-Co.i:- ovcrhec.c: ;'Ind nrofi· t-. Th~rn \·'~~ son1 , · · .l~ . (._; ..._ H~d ...._ -- (; mcn:1on of .. 
2 in testimony by Bob RO\v~ey. CE. 193) !\pDellant's: 
randums to the Court attempted to disrlel th~ · 
c n1pres2. 
that this .i.s a proper \HY to compute profit, hut the 
the Court used a twenty riercent multiplier indicates 
Court retained this erroneous impression. 
Section lO'l.0 1! of the Stand.:>.rd SpecJ.ficatic 
(Exh. D-2) go'1erns force amount payment. This secti:·i 
modified by a srecial provision (Sheet 6, Exh. D-4). I 
increased that add-on factor for profit percenta92 f!. 
twenty to thirty percent. The fact is, as is evide~:~ 
the languo.ge of the provisions in questions, that tq 
centage is not applied to all factors used to determ::J 
force account price. It is not applied to the equip:! 
which is usually the largest factor in the calculatic:~ 
it is not a true multi plier. As the Court knows, a ::j 
count arrangement is only resorted to when a pri~~1 
cannot otherwise be arrived c.t. It is artificial and: 
little relation to reality as far as ccsts of an cverJ 
tract. Appellant suhmi tc; that if this is the justiii:' 
for the Court's adoption of the twenty percent mul~~ 
I 
that the Court has committed obvjous error. There is-
reason with the evidence that the Court· l!acl in front J: 
b · · hc1d of der: for the Court to adopt such an ar itrary mec 
· The fi' a.ures in eviden:· damages for anticipated profit. _ 
with a little bit of milthematic..il cal.c 1 liltion, demonst:1· 
-33-
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the fallacy of Respondent's claims to anticipated profit. 
(Exh. D-77) 
Appellant believes this Court was correct in 
the case of Monter v. Kratzers Specialty Bready Company, 
29 Ut.2d 18, when it said: 
The fact that it is difficult to 
calculate damages will not prevent an injured 
party from recovery. However, a judgment can-
not be based upon mere speculation. 
Here the trial Court has obviously indulged in speculation 
to determine its award of profit to Respondent without 
properly analyzing the evidence before it. Appellant has 
obviously been injured by the Court's actions and is enti-
tled to relief. 
IV 
THE AWARD OF GENERAL DAMAGES IS NOT SUP-
PORTED BY THE EVIDENCE, IS EXCESSIVE AND 
REFLECTS PREJUDICE BY THE COURT. 
The trial Court awarded the sum of $100,000.00 as 
general damages in the judgment. Appellant believes that 
this amount is aribtrary and obviously excessive. Respondent 
in its complaint seeks the sum of $100,000.00 and with no 
substantial evidence to support the award other than the 
testimony of Mrs. Hitchcock to the effect that they were go-
ing to incur damages for counsel fees, etc. in a nonspecific 
amount, (R. 82-84) 2 the Court proceeded to award the full re-
quested sum. 
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not conb.cst i ng tl1e right of 
1 
Court Lo award general d~mages, assuming th~ fact~ 
breach of contract. ft is f\Jrthcc- c·:ow_:cdcd thctt a C:_ 
must exercise its judcJment as to whaL is n.!uso,iable: 
general damages cannot b:" asccrc:c.ined with great C'':" 
What Appellant. is ccncc-rned about, howevc.c, is the:·: 
prejudice e::hibited by the Court's ilWard of the enL:i 
ed amount rec1L1e3ted by Rcsponde:-it. If there were 
evidence in the record to support an award, it perha ~ 
be understandable. It is submitted that there isn::. 
stantial evidence in the record regarding <Jeneral 
(See R. 82-84 for only testimony in record.) 2 
Section 1037, Corbin on Cor-tracts, is enfr: 
''Exp:~nses of Litigation." This section deals with 
the only speci cic i terns referred to by l·'.r;;. llitchco-:::. 
reference to "general d=ages." 'l'his section reads ::I 
as follows: 
If t-he olaL1tiff can show that 
deff?ndant 1 s br;a~h" of ccntrctct has caused I: 
gatio:-i involving the plaintif c in the pa\-;;•· 
af counsel fees, CO'JCt co0c;ts in the amount 
the judgment and shows tu.:th,,,r that such . 
pen~:iture is .:eascnablc in ar.iou1~t and coul· 
have been avcided by him by redsonable a~ 
dent effort he can recover LiaD-3CJ<-" uga1nst 
def9ndant measured by the amount of these 
pePdi tu res. • l 
It is submitted that thcr'2 is no evidence tor 
C'\ (1) ~ 'd +- b "cl cor co11.~sel fees,·_., ti1e amount pui or ~o e paJ_ ..:: " 
( 2) that tl1 ~ ,"1nount cxrJended ·· costs or other expense; ~ , ' 
-35-
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sonable; and finally (3) that the expenditure could not 
be avoided by due and reasonable diligence. As to counsel 
fees, the standard was not met and as to the few other 
items she listed under this category of damages, there 
was likewise no attempt to specify or justify any amount. 
In choosing the remedy which was to assert a 
breach of contract and to refuse further performance, the 
law clearly intends that Respondent reco·v-er for work accom-
plished to the date of the breach, reasonable expenses of 
terminating the contract and in certain instances, antici-
pated profit. On the other hand, it does not require that 
the party who caused the breach be "penalized.~ 
One of the other general damage items raised in 
trial deals with the interruption of Respondent's financing 
and the alleged harships suffered as a result thereof. (R. 
82-84) 2 Apparently, Respondent was heavily committed finan-
cially and the delay involved in litigating this matter im-
posed a hardship on Respondent. Appellant has also suffered 
as must be obvious. Appellant does not believe that damages 
of this nature, real or substantial as they may be, are or 
should be cognizable. They simply are not "foreseeable." 
The landmark case of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 156 
Eng. Rep. (1834) established the rule or concept that damages 
must be "reasonably foreseeable" and it has been adopted by 
the Utah Court in the case of Pacific Coast Title Insurance 
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~'2.:__':'._:_ Ha_:c:!_f_2_r~l1c~~Jdt~r~~~--J:_f1_<~c_n:0i_~_LS:..S:'.:, 7 Ut. 2d lJi, 
325 P.2d 906, whercln the Court stated th~tt i 
c,1P1ages 1 .. 
coverable Jre: 
. based upon the concept or-
.._ teaso~-
able foreseeability that loss 
• \'lOUld rt· 
sult fro~ the breach. 
1\r:ipellant i.lsserts thi't how a party finance, 
operations internally and the possible difficulty 
may encounter for this reason in 3. hreach of contract: 
cut.side t:1c realms of a "foreseeable" damage. If he 
financed his operations without borrowing, then no~ 
0£ this nature would result. To require Appellant to 
for- Respondent's financing chi«:::ges adds to the diEnigq 
is contrary to the Paci£ le Coas L 'Ci tle InO'urance Co.:. 
Hartfbrd case, supra / as to foreseeability and also c:" 
I 
trary to the genera 1 law which prohibits the party not 
breach from adding to the damages. This point is ill:\ 
by the case of Bomber~12r v. McKe~_vPy, 35 cal.2d 607,.r 
729 (1950) where the Court stated the following: 
. . . E:i ther party to an executory con:: 
has the p0wer to stop ?erfor,11ance on the co:: 
by givinq notice or d.i_rection to tnat effec:: 
jtccting hims•.Jlf to liability for dzimages, i:.: 
receipt of suci1 notice tiw other party can''.: 
tin~e to perfo.1:r;i and .rP.c::iver d2rnages bas~:~j. 
pertormance. (C1til'.:1ons or.lltted.) This .. ,. 
plic&tion of l he principle that a plaintiti 
mitigate d,~,inaqes so far ilS he can without 11 
himself. ; 
Obviously, 2. party caus:'ng a breach must lrJ 
tiie resull~; of that ilction. So cilso must the party.: .. ; 
I 
-J7 . 
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elects to stand on the breach. He should not recover more 
than is reasonable and fair to both parties. To compensate 
him for such things as internal financing costs, alleged ex-
penses such as Court costs and counsel fees, etc., under 
the guise of "general damages" without requiring the party 
to make a substantial effort to support them in the record, 
particularly when some of the elements of the so-called 
general damages are not legally recoverable, works a "gross 
injustice." Appellant believes that the Court's award of 
the entire claimed sum of $100,000.00 as general damages re-
sults in a gross injustice to Appellant. Appellant further 
submits that Respondent has not met the burden of demon-
strating the fact of general damages, let alone a reasonable 
basis for the Court to exercise discretion in awarding any 
amount and that the entire amount awarded should be elimi-
nated from the judgment. 
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE COURT'S 
AWARD FOR VARIOUS OTHER ITEMS IN THE JUDG-
MENT AND FURTHER THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO 
ALLOW CERTAIN OFFSETS IS CONTRARY TO THE 
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 
A. OTHER ITEMS NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE 
Much of the evidence presented by both parties 
during the trial dealt with the question of sums due Respon-
dent fur work done to the date of breach. Closely tied to 
-38-
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thi:o was the question oi: ot f sc ts due i'1l)l-··.:'1 lant fo, :.: 
partially complete on the date of breach. 
Appellant, in addition to the Court's 
a1:.ia:: 
anti~ipated profit and general damages refcrrau• ~ to i:. 
Section IV of this brief, believes that the Court h·· 
'" 
mitted error in the award of the follm·15.n<J sums: 
(1) Cost of Water (Unrccovered drilling cost) 
(2) Salaries to Key Personnel 
(3) Restoration of Price Reduction 
( ~) Equipmevt Rental Paid to Others 
$ B, ~ 
39,, 
!,, 
191,: I 
( 5) Bituminous Paving Done l\fter Breach ~-
TOTAL . 
.$301,4 
(1) COST OP WATER 
I 
As to the cost of water, this was allegedly 
remaining unamortized out of a total su.'11 of $'77,372.~'. 
P-52) incurred by Respondent accorciing to the testimor. 
Mrs. Hitchcock. (R. 34-39) 2 A];)pellant asserts that th:: 
is not a separate pay item under the contract and the:• 
has to be included in an existing cont:ract pay item, 
Court's Attention is invited to the item of mobilizatio 
(see Exh. D-2, page 269, Section GOl. 01) ~vhicll reads i:. 
tinent part as follows: 
Mobilizc1 ti on sha l.l consist of prepar~tor. 
· · 1 d · b 't not 11.:n· work and ope.rations, ..:.nr_; u ing, t. sc 
to those necessary for the movement of per, 
I • , , . • _ t the P•, equJ.pment, supplies a:1:1 u_:cidentals -0 offit' 
ject site, for the est-:iblishment of all 
I 
I 
-39-
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buildings and other facilities necessary 
for work on the project; for furnishing 
. : . and for all other work and operations 
which must be performed, or cost incurred 
not otherwise paid for prior to beginning' 
wc;>rk on the va~ious items on the project 
site. (Emphasis supplied.) 
Appellant respectfully submits that to allow Re-
spondent separate payment for this item will result in double 
payment. It is obvious from the emphasized portion of the 
language in Section 601.01, supra, that since the providing 
of water is a prerequisite for most items of roadway work, 
it must be provided for "prior to beginning work on the vari-
ous items" and that it is "not otherwise paid for." If Re-
spondent for its own purposes chooses not to charge this item 
to the mobilization item (unbalanced bid) that, of course, is 
its prerogative; however, the submission of the bid on the 
mobilization item pursuant to the specification presumably in-
eludes payment for this work and it is improper to accept Re-
spondent's self-serving assertions as the trial Court appar-
ently did that they did not charge the expense to the mobili-
zation item. (R. 37) 2 The witness Wood contradicted his em-
ployee, Mrs. Hitchcock, in explaining what the bid item of 
"mobilization" included and specified "developing water" as 
one item. (R. 196) 2 This is an open invitation to chicanery, 
contrary to the contract provision, and in conflict with Re-
spondent's principal officer's testimony. 
rt is also beyond comprehension that a contractor 
would incur that kind of expense on the front end of a con-
-40-
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q 
tr a cl o.nd i:lic:n µro-rc, i~e Uie cus t ove.c l'luLk 
l te111s ii'!, 
knows will not be co~pletod Uil~i ~ nea.c the ~ 
en"' oft' t 
tract. (To-·\·iiL; untrc-,ated base c~our:s'" dild µaving,) 
realistically will include it j n tllc mo bi lizaUon i 
kno':ling that ho can r2cover a substunt.i.al portion 
expense at an earlier stage. (S<'e S•cc·::ion 601 OJ. 
- • - u:. t 
269 of Exh. D-2 wherein it is provided that the 
i tern is released in stc,ges as the contract is cornpl:: 
instance, twenty-five percent completion triggers rc'.j 
sixty perc,~nt of the total mobilization i tern. See a. 
lvood' s explanation on pages 196 and 197) 2 
t2) SALARIES TO KEY PERSONNEL 
(4) EQDIPl-!Zi'lT RENTAL l'AID TO O'J'HERS 
(5) BITUMINOUS PAVINS DONE AFTI::R BREACH 
As to the salaries of key personnel, eguip·i 
rental paid to others and bituminous paving done su0o:j 
to the breach, the .hppellant cites the case of Blair,J 
v. U.S. for Use of Greqory-H~C@~ __ et_al..'..., 147 F.2d1::1
1 
I 
wherein the Court j_n conunenting on da!~iages allowable •:I 
a breach of a construction contract states the foJlm:q 
page 848: 
. Expenses incurred by a party i~;'( 
paration for performance of a contract ber0:: 
its a!Janclonme n t by the other party are ~r1~'.: 
elements of cl.11~age:: Cc'.used by the breac .. 
Co·-:10.n v. Smith, 149 F. 945) and •::ienerally,• 
breach of-a constr11ct.i.on contract prevents.~· 
rorrnance the damacre:; are ( 1) what is expence . 
.., c ts +-hat i 
ward the pertormaric2, 'Cnd (:?) pro 1 0 t0J 
have been i:-edl ized bv full pe:cformance. ~--:, 
~~!::''?.~~--Le':'_~~ ;-i_i_:;_ t. __:'.'.._:_.J'~t;\·l.i,_ 11 iam:.c_ QE..':'.~~~ 
-41-
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Cir., 40 F.2d 873. We don't see, in the cir-
cumstances disclosed by this record, how charges 
for ~ent of the machines can be allowed. The 
machines belonged to plaintiffs. They were to 
be used on the project. Their use on the work 
migh~ have produced a net profit. Whether any 
profits would have resulted if plaintiffs had 
fully performed is left to pure speculation which 
is not sufficient as a basis for damages. U.S. v. 
Reha~, 110 U.S. 338; ... As said by the Supreme 
Court in Miller v. Robertson, 26 U.S. 243, 45 s. 
Ct. 73, 78, 69 L. Ed. 265: 
One who fails to perform his contracts 
is justly bound to make good all damages 
that accrue naturally from the breach; and 
the other party is entitled to be put in as 
good a position pecuniarily as he would have 
been by performance of the contract. 
He is not, however, entitled to better his condi-
tion nor to profit by non-performance. We think 
there is a logical difference between expenses in-
curred and an allo~ance for the rent of machinery 
not in fact used and there are practical reasons 
for allowing the one and rejecting the other. • . 
Appellant concedes that a rental expense incurred 
for machinery owned by others may be recoverable by Respon-
dent. However, the rental agreements in this matter were 
either "purchase contracts in disguise" or could apparently 
have been cancelled at will with no penalty. (See Exhibits 
2 
D-78, D-80, D-81, D-82, and R. 115-121, 488-490.) Appellant 
asserts therefore that the crucial question becomes the date 
that damages cease to run against Appellant. When Respondent 
elected to adept the remedy of cessation of performance and 
to stand on the breach and refuse to perform, he incurred the 
duty of mitigating damages at that point. His failure to act 
accordingly does not obligate Appellant to respond in damages. 
Assuming arguendo that a reasonable time follows during which 
-4 2-
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the parties sc0k for a 1,·ay out of tL0 i."lpa:>se it 1 ~ c 
cci.vable tlktt his fuilurc to .:ict should not nrev 
,. ent ,, , 
If indeed this is cor.cect, tlwn Ap;)ella,1t assert::; thl! 
spondent's letter of October 22, 197S, (Exh. P-1) is: I 
off date of that neriocl since Mr. \'/uod · 
"' unequivocally:: 
tlvit "we consider our contract with the State has be~. 
mina te•l" on th3. t cla te. If l\ppellant is correct L1 t:1: 1 
pretation of the law, then thf'> amou;•t .::.1."1c1rdec1 for eqii: 
rental is at lest three times whac «.roulr1 be b 
- • - reasona l: I 
Exh. P-42) The Court awarded damages bu.sed on three r 
rental. 
L!.kewise, the salaries to key personnel shou::1 
·.vhat they should be. (Sec Exh. P-49) 
The payment of $49, 559 .18 for paving done aftq 
breach is in u.ddition to contract arr,oullts paid and has:j 
been cOJrunen ted on in Section I I C. Resrondent should d 
ped from further recovery or the old contract should t0I 
sidered revived by this election of the remedy of proc:j 
with peL·formance. In either event, nroper recovery is:\ 
tract price, or the reasonable vL1lue. of the work, not:! 
ditional swn which the Court: has awarded for this iten:J 
force account. 
( 3) RESTORAT:i:ON OF PD.ICE REDUCTION 
Finally, as to the reatoration of th2 
cf $1,822.37, Appellant finds this to be one of 
-4 3·-
price re:-j 
th£ mod 
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tasteful acts of the trial Court even though the amount is 
somewhat insignificant. The problem results from alleged 
erroneous test information and whether or not the Respon-
dent acted on that information. The unrefuted testimony 
of Mr. Weldon Heaton is that he "caught his own error, tried 
to reach Mr. Wood, was unsuccessful, so he drove to the plant 
and delivered the corrected report and found that the operator 
had not changed the plant settings. (R. 529) 1 This means no 
production deficiencies on that day resulted from the errone-
ous test. The price reduction is therefore proper. He further 
testified concerning a conversation with Mr. Wood about this 
test result, in which Mr. Wood admitted that the results were 
correct, (R. 5jOJ 1 and the price reduction was proper. This 
was not refuted in the evidence. 
B. OFFSETS NOT ALLOWED 
Considerable evidence was offered relating to off-
sets claimed by Appellant. Substantial offsets were allowed 
by the Court, and certain offsets were stipulated to. Appel-
lant is concerned by the failure of the Court to grant more 
than $11,055.00 for the cost of finishing embankment. This 
sum is the amount Respondent testified it would cost to finish 
subgrade. 
opinion. 
The Respondent's testimony was based mostly on his 
(R. 544-551) 2 Appellant is mindful of the fact that 
the Court will not reverse the trial Court if there is "sub-
stantiaJ competent evidence" in the record to support the trial 
-44-
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Court's rul.in]. 
UiSrC:CjLJrd Of the .'\ppelL:rnt IS testlc: 
the trial CoL1rt, J'-'.)[-'Cll,1r.t sub:nit:3 tlwt the trial Cn 
., 
failed to properly ev;1 1_uate the testimony ,rnd has e:: 
the arr.oun t o t tLe darnC>'J'' award. 
i\pp<:'llcint subn•.ittcd the tccstimony of £lob F: 
a project engineer on a project similar in s cop'" a~J :
1 
near Beaver and which was being worked at the sa~~ 
the subject project. (s,,c R. 179-216) 2 llr. Rowley td 
that actual experience with Respondent indicated t~tl 
finishing the subgrnde to be $0. 29 per squ;;re yard. q 
Zil, R. 206) 2 The sRrne c;quipment, opercitors o.nd supe:··-1 
applied to both jobs. 'l'he ·,1itness Jame:; Cox tosti'.kt 
the actual required arro;a of refinishing on the subjec:.• 
ject was ~91,206 square yards. (See R. 230) 2 Respor.:0 
made no effort to snbmic·. the basis for its figu.ce but f 
offered the "opinion of Mr. Wood" to sup;:iort the figd 
ferred to. (R. 544-551) 2 
At the time of the alleged breach there had L' 
1, 000, 000 plus cubic yards of rouJway excavation place:! 
D-69, Page 2) Some of the grade built with this iteDJ 
plel~e and accepted, some was not. Clearly l\ppellant ·-~ 
I 
titled to an offset for t!'le required finishingundert.t 
'J.'h·~' amount claimed by Appellant "', of contract breach. 
to ten percent of the tot01.l c:!.pproxir.lately. rt is supfJ 
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by competent evidence, both from the testimony of engineers 
as well as documentary, including a series of photographs. 
(Exh. D-63, D-64, and D-65) By contrast, Respondent offers 
the naked opinion of the Respondent's chief officer with no 
attempt to support this by any calculations, figures or sho~~ 
ing as to how their figure is determined. (R. 544-551) 2 This 
in the opinion of Appellant is not tenable. It does not demon-
strate an even-handed approach to the evidence by the trial 
Court. 'I'he contractor should be the best judge of what his 
costs are, but that does not excuse him from the requirement 
of submitting "competent evidence" based on recognizable fac-
tors or standards to support his "opinion." This he failed to 
do. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully submits that there is abundant 
evidence of error in the record. The trial Court formed an 
impression very early in the proceedings that Appellant had 
breached the contract and seemed unable thereafter to properly 
evaluate the evidence during trial. This pre-judgment mani-
fests itself in various erroneous legal rulings by the Court 
which are obvious and in more subtle fashion by the tendency 
of the Court to accept Respondent's position over that of Ap-
pellant any time there is a conflict in the evidence. 
Appellant concedes that the initial reaction of a 
layman when presented with the facts surrounding the dispute 
-46-
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• 
which leads to this liU_gation is "1,t1y clof's .1\)pelJant. 
sist on a specified n1ethod of agc;cegate pr<"paration ·.;:·, 
it would appe~r that Respondent 
tial compliance with acceptance 
can ach1 eve ut i 01, . 
'->t,, 
s tandard:c: by its own .-,
1 
The trial Court obviously could not set aside this 
When confronted with the mass of testimony in s11pport:I 
validity of the "method specification" the Court c~~ 
sidestep the obvious conclusion by its finding that 
of a verbal assurance prior to submission of its biH~ 
dent was excused from having to comply. Appellant b~Li~ 
this clearly demonstrates how far the trial judge was::: 
'I 
pared to go to validate his initial conclusion. 
The t't 
sue is not vvbat was the pre-bici assurance or even what· 
contract itself says. The :ceal issue is, did Respond;;: 
comply with his own proposal regarding aggregate stora·:' 
preparation as set forth in his letter of May 28, 19Jl: 
proposill was approved by Appellant and it is submitted· 
evidence clearly establishes that Respondent never dia: 
with his own proposal. The trial Court, contrary to f1•• 
mental legal principles, fails to construe a docwe~r 
the drafter of the document. It is apparent that Appel 
understood the proposal to be that three piles wooN~ 
to feed the asphalt plant. It is further apparent that· 
spondent knew what Appellant's understanding of iU~~ 
was and remained silent. This .ts either fraud by theR' 
dent or at the least an ambiguity in construing a docl1'' 
-47-
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which should be construed against the drafter. The Court 
chose to ignore this point. 
Appellant asserts that the overwhelming evidence 
and conclusion is that Respondent breached the contract first 
by failing to comply with its May 28, 1975 proposal and later 
the written directive to comply with this proposal by Appel-
lant's engineer on September 23, 1975. 
The subsequent failure of the trial Court to find 
that the actions of both joint venture partners subsequent to 
the alleged breach constitute a waiver of the breach or an 
election to continue performance is further evidence of the 
trial Court's pre-disposition to find Appellant in a breach. 
The trial Court ignored the evidence or refused to hear evi-
dence from Appellant on this point. 
Finally, in its ruling concerning damages, the trial 
Court again demonstrates that the Respondent's position is to 
be accepted over that of Appellant on any disputed point. 
This is clearly manifest in the small item involving an al-
leged erroneous test. The Court chose to ignore unrefuted 
testimony of the lab technician that no change in plant set-
tings occurred and accpeted Respondent's version. The bias 
of the trial Court is equally manifest in the outright rejec-
tion of Appellant's argument based on Respondent's own evi-
dence that anticipated-profit could not exceed a figure cf 
approxim3tcly $100,000.00 in favor of an arbitrary multiplier 
of twenty percent of an assumed figure of work remaining. 
-48-
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This rnul tiplircr j_s not based on evidence ·i"d · .. 
<._ ~ L.1 pat: 
arbitrary, ca pr icj ous ::incl demons t.rates an irresp . 
on,_. 
dis~·egard for cl2,1r evidence in the recot·d. 
In fairness to the trial Court there was ,.
1 
attPmpt to be Cair in other items of damage such ao 
·1 
mcnt rental Qncl sal.L11:ies to key r_:iersonnel subsequeiq 
date of breach. Appellant submi l:s, ho11'e1·er, that"' 
'·I 
Court could have resolved this problem easi.i.y by eq 
the law of breach to the effect t:hat once the elert) 
.. r 
made to stand on the breach, both partic;s have to i: 
the result. Or.e month after the alleged breach occt 
Respondent ca.tc;gorically stated there was no contre:· 
ing, and this should be the cut-off date. This mea:. 
award for equipment rental, salaries, etc. is at le;: 
times what it should have been since the Court chose~ 
i110nth period as the cut--off. The Court's excessive:l 
general damages to the extent of 100% of that cla.foe: 
substantial testimony to support the award aga~d~ 
the Court's strong bias against Appellant. 
Finally, the Court's total rej9ction ofAPf' 
evidence regarding offsets for fj_nishing the subgraci. 
evidence w;:is well docwnented anci supported in favoro: 
dent's undocumented self-ser,;ing "opinion," again aei· 
the bias of the trial Court. 
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Appellant respectfully submits that the judgment 
should be reversed and that Appellant should be awarded 
judgment against Respondent for its breach of the contract 
or for its subsequent breach of the revived contract. Alter-
natively, Appellant submits that the judgment should be set 
aside and the matter remanded to the trial Court for a new 
trial. Finally, in the event this Court sustains the triai 
Court in its finding of .a breach, the Appellant- submits that 
substantial reductions in the amount of damages are in order 
as set forth above. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN, Attorney Gener~l· 
. /_2~.,, / 4:---/i 
- / ·-- / //::-.-r_,(' ~ j; By X.;,,c.::_~ ... ::- / ,,..- ( //,._.'/ 
Dl~LAND • FOED 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Appellant 
CER'l'IFICA'TE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that two copies of the foregoing 
Appellant's Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, to John G. 
Marshall of Tuft and Marshall, Attorney for Respondent, Goj 
East 4500 South, Suite B, Salt Lake City, Utah 84107, this 
3rd day of January, 1978. 
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